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The United States Constitution was written with the expectation that our government officials 
serve with integrity.  Normative theory of public administration is grounded through the oath of 
office to uphold the Constitution. When people in the U. S. become victims of catastrophic 
events, they expect a unity of purpose in the governance process that involves nothing short of 
the highest standard of ethical behavior. 
In Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith Dr. Adams gives an ethnographic perspective of 
those whose lives were affected, not just by Hurricane Katrina, but by the second order disaster 
of failing recovery assistance. The changes that people experienced in these two disasters altered 
their sense of self and place across socioeconomic, race, gender and age differences. For many of 
those who were victims of the storm, they became vulnerable to those who held responsibility in 
assisting with the recovery efforts. The book shows questionable ethical issues and problems 
related to principal agent theory. The question posed throughout the book: why is there so little 
accountability and such a lack of coordination that left many people, still to this day, trying to 
recover from the 2005 event? Adams (2013) points out that the “larger story about recovery that 
needed to be told was about how market forces involved in recovery were exacerbating existing 
inequalities, delaying recovery, and creating a new type of economy in ways that were 
significant not just for those recovering from the disaster but for all of those involved helping 
them do so as well” (p.18).  
 There is a belief in American history that when disaster strikes, it would be the 
community, neighbors and friends that would come to the rescue. Stories have often been told 
and passed down of how people and local businesses would pitch in and provide materials and 
labor to help those who have been victimized by a disaster. There seemed to be a moral ethos 
that we care for our own. Adams is highly qualified as an ethnographical researcher in social 
sciences, reflecting twenty-two years of experience in anthropology, aging, displacement politics 
and disaster capitalism, to reflect on the trauma and treatment that victims received post-Katrina. 
At any time in our life when we experience trauma, we count on assistance to follow moral and 
ethical principles regarding how we are treated. Our drive to get back to normal is not reflected 
in victims’ desire to benefit from the disaster, but simply to be made whole again. 
 The eight chapters of Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith describe how people from 
different backgrounds and facing unique levels of loss experienced the recovery process. Chapter 
1 sets the standard of being a study of a “second order disaster” resulting from  the interests of 
government contractors profiting from those who have lost the most and have so little (p. 1). The 
study gives insight into future research looking at methods that would facilitate effective, 
efficient, and ethical public and private disaster aid response. With the intensity of some 
disasters, clientele may need to reconsider their expectations of the level of government response 
to individuals in need—in other words, at what level is government capable of responding and 
what point does the individual need to pursue private sector solutions to the recovery of personal 
loss (e.g., insurance)?  The second chapter describes how we can put off to tomorrow what 
should be done today. Having empirical evidence that the levee systems were not sufficient to 
sustain such a large storm, it was the public budget that failed before the storm arrived. Funding 
was funneled into those projects that carried commercial interest rather than those that would 
have stabilized the existing flood protection system. Adams describes recovery effort that was 
racially profiled. The areas where people lost the most were low income areas and racially 
segregated. Those areas were also where programs for public housing were eliminated from the 
redevelopment efforts with no new low income housing accommodations made. The ethical 
treatment of those who are most vulnerable in our society seems to have received low priority at 
best. 
 Arguably, the process of recovery should be one in which reviving the community into an 
economically functional state would be a priority. Throughout the process, those who were 
contracted to provide the means of recovery had focused on the interests of the contractor. Those 
who remained in New Orleans, as well as those seeking to return, were overwhelmed with 
bureaucratic red tape that tested the patience of residents. In the name of government regulation, 
action on applications was delayed for months or years only to be  denied due to lack of 
supporting documentation, much of which was lost when public buildings were flooded. Those 
seeking to navigate the system found that rules were interpreted to reflect different meanings or 
had been updated with no public notice. Security staffs were more interested in incarcerating 
people than protecting them, as though New Orleans was a war zone. People were left on their 
own to solve their problems while having to contend with the impact of the initial disaster. 
 Adams found that the people and the companies contracted to provide aid where not held 
accountable. “The federal government resources allocated to the Road Home Program seemed 
clearly more than adequate to compensate all of the homeowners fully for their losses, especially 
with figures like $800 million floating about. But somehow these funds were not making it to the 
people like Gerald” (p. 82). This system left those who needed assistance vulnerable to con-
artists and thieves that would propose to restore their homes or clean out debris for substantial 
upfront fees that disappeared as quickly as the offer. Property that was vacant was looted for 
anything of value. Those contractors that had assumed responsibility for security were not 
providing services in these residential areas.  
 The faith-based community groups were often those providing the actual physical labor 
and often arranged for contributions of materials. Adams states that “[h]elping others in need is a 
moral virtue, while making profits on this work is seen as equally virtuous” (p. 11). The botched 
recovery efforts affected people in the African American community in particular. High poverty 
rates that existed before Katrina, in combination with a lack of employment and skyrocketing 
rents removed many of the poor in New Orleans (p. 178). Charities working in mixed areas and 
neighborhoods that found many of the new poor in the city were people who previously had been 
self-supporting.  
 According to Adams, a non-profit organization called the Citizens’ Road Home Action 
Team (CHAT) gathered evidence of the problems and inefficiencies that were synonymous with 
the Road Home program. Among these problems were repeatedly lost paperwork, continuous 
changes to the rules, slow payout of grant money, and “unusually lucrative arrangements for 
contractors despite their poor quality control and inconsistency of grant calculations” (p. 182). 
Adams contributes much of the problems of private industry acting irresponsibly, ineffectively 
responding to federal and state subcontracting policies that allowed for profit entities to do relief 
work.   A lack of government oversight might have led to profiteering and mismanagement.  
 The cost of a recovery effort is estimated to be fifteen times higher than the cost of the 
proactive planning process needed to manage the effects of a disaster such as wrought by 
Hurricane Katrina. The success of the nonprofit sector is largely due to the use of volunteers and 
unpaid labor.  Taxpayers paid twice:  once in the form of tax payment and the second time 
through their own sweat equity [i.e., “on the backs of victims and volunteers” (p. 186)]. 
Referring to the situation as perverse, Adams expresses that allowing for-profit corporate 
interests into the sector of humanitarian recovery raises serious ethical issues. The government 
protects the interests of market oriented businesses even in disaster relief but thereby adds to 
social suffering. The government, through corporations, provided assistance that drove victims 
into debt beyond their ability to pay, while protecting the interests of the banking industry (p. 7). 
Adding insult to injury was the penetration of for-profit corporations (stipulating efficiencies) 
into the non-profit sector, which limited non-profits’ ability to provide adequate relief. Financed 
largely through philanthropy, non-profits met the demands for financial responsibility by 
providing relief without consideration of the degree of loss experienced by individuals. 
 In the practice of public administration, we remain accountable for the responsibilities of 
government and the practice of public management. Transparency is paramount if public 
consumer-victims of aid relief are to retain faith in the equity and ethics surrounding the process 
of crisis recovery.  Markets of Sorrow, Labors of Faith is a book recommended for scholars and 
practitioners exploring the ethical dilemmas surrounding public management in the face of crisis. 
Is there a point we find that private enterprise is more ineffective and incurs higher costs in 
providing public services than we are willing to pay? May we conclude that certain public 
functions do not fare well with profit driven practices? Can we compromise our core values at a 
time as when we are serving those in the greatest need? 
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